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SIERRA CLUB v. BLOCK,
WILDERNESS WATER RIGHTS PROTECTED
WHERE NOT IN CONFLICT WITH PURPOSES
OF NATIONAL FOREST IN COLORADO
WILDERNESS ACT-The Wilderness Act mandates a withdrawal
and a second reservation of federal public lands, distinct from the
reservation of these lands for purposes of the national forest. WATER
LAW--Congress intended for this second reservation to have an im-
plied water right consistent with the purposes of the Wilderness Act.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Wilderness Act of 1964 created a framework for Congress to
designate lands within the national forest system as wilderness areas.'
Alleging that Congress had intended to reserve water for these wilderness
areas, the Sierra Club sued federal officials in Colorado federal district
court for failing to secure that water right? The Sierra Club alleged that
federal reserved water rights exist in Colorado wilderness areas. The Club
argued that federal officials' failure to claim water rights was arbitrary
and constituted unlawfully withheld agency action.'
In November of 1985, Sierra Club v. Block recognized for the first
time a federal reserved water right in wilderness areas.4 The court found
that the statutory provisions of the Wilderness Act comprised all the duties
owed by federal officials. Since the Act did not contain an express specific
duty to claim water rights for wilderness areas, the court did not find that
defendant federal officials -unlawfully withheld agency action,' or that
federal officials' past actions were arbitrary or capricious. 6 Instead, the
court admonished defendants for their lack of action and ordered them
to submit a plan for conformance with their now-recognized duty to
protect water rights in wilderness areas.7 In addition, the court found that
no duties were owed under a public trust claim.!
I. Wilderness Act, Pub. L. No. 88-577, §§2-7, 16 USC H 1131-36 (1982).
2. Sierra Club v. Block. 622 F.Supp. 842 (D.C.Colo. 1985).
3. Id. at 846. The Sierra Club argued that federal officials had a duty under 16 U.S.C. § 526,
the Wilderness Act, and the public trust doctrine.
4. Id. at 851.
S. Id. at 864.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 865. The court ordered defendants to submit a memorandum explaining their plans to
comply with their statutory obligation to reserve water for wilderness areas. Defendants appealed
from this order. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that the district judge's request for
a memorandum left his final decision open. pending his review of the government's plan. With no
final decision, therefore, the appeals were premature. The appeals were dismissed and the causes
remanded to the district court. Sierra Club v. Lyng, No. 86-1153 (10th Cir. Oct. 8, 1986).
8. Sierra, 622 F.Supp. 842, 866 (DC.Colo. 1985).
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This Note outlines the development of the reserved water rights doctrine
and analyzes its use in the Sierra opinion. The Note also describes recent
tests used by the Supreme Court to shape the amounts of water reserved
under the doctrine, and analyzes the Sierra opinion's use of one such
test, the consistent purposes test. The Note concludes the Sierra court
did not need to apply the consistent purposes test to find a federal reserved
water right exists for wilderness areas, and use of the test weakened the
Sierra opinion.
BACKGROUND: THE RESERVED WATER RIGHTS DOCTRINE
Courts developed the reserved water rights doctrine to protect federal
interests in the western states where water scarcity and state laws com-
bined to restrict the government's water rights. The doctrine stems from
the judicial finding that "whatever powers the [s]tates acquired over their
waters as a result of [C]ongressional Acts and admission into the Union,
... Congress did not intend thereby to relinquish its authority to reserve
unappropriated water in the future for use on appurtenant lands withdrawn
from the public domain for specific federal purposes." 9 In part the doctrine
was a reaction to western states' attempts to use, regulate, and control
waters in ways consistent with scarcity but inconsistent with the common
law theory of riparian rights. The riparian rule was that every riparian
owner was entitled to the continued natural flow of the stream;'" however,
in the western states, one person's use could mean another's certain loss.
The states created a doctrine of prior appropriation to ensure that those
who used water could rely upon a right to continued use unaffected by
subsequent water demands..Under the doctrine, states ranked water rights
by their dates of initial use or appropriation. The first in time received a
right which would be filled first; then the next in time, and so forth; each
right being prioritized according to the date of appropriation.
In 1899, the Supreme Court recognized the existence of this new
common law theory of water rights." In United States v. Rio Grande
Irrigation Co., the Court noted that Congress had already recognized a
rule of prior appropriation in passage of the mining and desert lands acts
of 1866 and 1877.) The Court accepted the states' right to interpret and
alter common law, but reserved federal rights to wateruse in two ways. 3
First, states could not destroy the federal government's right, as owner
of lands bordering on a stream, to the continued flow of the stream.' 4
9. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 698 (1978).
10. United States v. Rio Grande Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690, 702 (1899).
11. Id. at 702-703.
12. Id. at 704. 705.
13. Id. at 703.
14. Id.
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Second, states only could exercise control over water subject to Congress'
absolute power over navigable streams.' 5
In Rio Grande, the Court suggested three sources of federal control
over the Rio Grande River: by treaty,' 6 by the Property Clause,' 7 and by
the Commerce Clause.' 8 The Court also relied on the Supremacy Clause 9
when it cited to an 1890 Congressional act specifically prohibiting any
obstruction affecting the navigable capacity of any waters.2 The asserted,
state-recognized, date of appropriation for the rights at issue was sub-
sequent to this 1890 Congressional enactment.2  Therefore, even under
the state system of prior appropriation, the federal right was senior.22
Nine years later, the Court relied upon the federal power to reserve
waters and exempt them from state appropriation when it decided a dispute
over Indian rights.23 In Winters v. United States, the United States, on
behalf of Indians in the Fort Belknap Reservation, brought suit against
citizens of Montana for trespass on Indian water rights. The Court found
that the Indians' right to use water was not governed by the state's system
of prior appropriation, but rather by a treaty adopted in 1888.2' The Court
examined why Congress entered into the 1888 treaty and found that when
Congress created a reservation, it intended to reserve water for its purpose
15. Id.
16. Id. at 699-701. The Court considered the Gadsden treaty of 1853, but concluded that whatever
obligations the United States owed to Mexico, it owed greater obligations to its own people as
guardians of the nation's waterways.
17. Id. at 703. The Property Clause, U.S.CoNsT. art. IV, § 3, was relied upon implicitly in Rio
Grande, but has been relied upon explicitly in later cases. Federal Power Comm'n v. Oregon, 349
U.S; 435, 443 (1954), (in which authority to issue licenses for water in relation to public lands and.
reservations of the United States was founded on the Property Clause).
18. Rio Grande, 174 U.S. 690, 703-10 (1899). U.S.CoNsT., art. 1, §8, cl. 3.
19. The opinion relied on the assumption that federal legislative action preempts state legislative
action under the Supremacy Clause. U.S.CoNsT., art. VI, § 2.
20. Rio Grande, 174 U.S. 690, 707 (1899).
21. Id. Appellees were the Rio Grande Irrigation and Land Company, Limited, and the Rio Grande
Dam and Irrigation Company, whose application to impound the waters of the Rio Grande had been
approved by the Territory of New Mexico, and confirmed by the Supreme Court of the Territory.
Id. at 690, 695.
22. See id. at 707. The Court did not state that the enactment date of the federal legislation had
to precede appellees' claim in order for the government to reserve waters. The Court stated that
even if the federal claim was considered within the state system of prior appropriation, the federal
claim preceded the appellees' claim.
23. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 577 (1908).
24. Id. at 575. Rio Grande had stated that prior appropriation could affect only questions between
citizens of a state. Rio Grande, 174 U.S. at 704 (1899). Since Indians were not citizens of Montana.
they may not have been subject to the doctrine. Winters. however, apparently reconciled the federal
system of reserved water rights with the state system of prior appropriation by dating the Indians'
right at 1888. This pegged the Indians' right to a federal right, despite the fact that the Indians were
a sovereign people who had been using the water long before the treaty. The sovereign status of
Indian tribes suggests additional problems when reconciling federal reserved rights with state systems
of prior appropriation.
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of providing a homeland for the Indians. 5 Winters reaffirmed the core of
the federal reserved water rights doctrine: the power of the federal gov-
ernment to reserve waters was undeniable if asserted by Congress.26
Further, courts would look to Congressional legislation to find intent to
reserve waters and to determine when waters were reserved. 7
In 1963, the Supreme Court expressed the broadest reach of the reserved
water rights doctrine.28 The Court majority in Arizona v. California in-
terpreted the Boulder Canyon Project Act, and found that Congress had
delegated substantial power to the Secretary of the Interior. Under the
Act, the Secretary could allocate the waters of the Colorado River both
between states, and within a state's borders. 2 A vigorous dissent objected
to this reach of federal power to allocate waters even within the states."
The dissent argued that Congress had long recognized and respected state
sovereignty in regard to the division and allocation of the state's waters.3'
The split between those justices finding federal authority and justices
advocating states' rights was reflected in another finding within the opin-
ion. While the Court majority found a federal reserved water right in
both Indian and non-Indian federal reservations,32 the dissent expressed
misgivings regarding the amount of water allocated to the Indian Res-
ervations. 3
Arizona v. California illustrated twin and competing philosophies in-
volved in western water disputes: federal interest and power balanced
against federal restraint and respect for state sovereignty. The dissent's
25. Winters, 207 U.S. at 564, 576. A similar holding was reached in United States v. Powers.
305 U.S. 527 (1939) (wherein the Court analyzed treaties between the Crow tribe and the government
to determine whether waters had been impliedly though not expressly reserved).
26. The Winters Court quoted from Rio Grande: "[the power of the Government to reserve
waters and exempt them from appropriation under state laws is not denied, and could not be." (In
Winters, 207 U.S. at 577).
27. Although the Court did not state that the Indians had acquired a right of appropriation under
the state system with a priority date of 1888, the practical effect of the decision was to give the
Indians a federally based date of appropriation, recognized within the state's prior appropriation
system. See supra note 24.
28. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
29. Id. at 561. The Court majority also found that the United States had broad powers under the
Commerce Clause to regulate navigable waters, and under the Property Clause to regulate government
lands and reserve water for its reservations, Id. at 597-98.
30. Id. at 603-27. Justice Harlan, joined by Justices Douglas and Stewart, dissented to the
delegation of power to the Secretary of the Interior. Douglas also filed a separate dissent. Id. at 627.
31. Id. at 603, 613-14.
32. Id. at 601. The majority held that water was essential to the success of Indian reservations,
echoing Winters. Despite vigorous arguments by the state of Arizona that the amount of water rights
granted should be based on current use, the Court found that such a formula would foreclose future
growth on the reservation, and thereby defeat its purpose. The Court stated that the only practical,
and least speculative, method of determining the amount was to calculate the number of practicably
irrigable acres. It was to this formula that the dissent objected.
1 33. Id. at 603.
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concern over the amount of the awarded federal reserved water right,
however, suggested a path for judicial compromise which was given
doctrinal form in Cappaert v. United States."
In Cappaert, a unanimous Court found that a reserved water right was
created with the federal designation of a national monument. The Court,
however, expressly limited that right to "only that amount of water nec-
essary to fulfill the purpose of the reservation, no more."" This com-
promise expressed both federal power and federal deference to state control.
While the Court in Cappaert again found a federal reserved water right,
the Court restricted that right to the minimum necessary to fulfill the
federal purpose.'
The minimal amount test for a reserved water right in Cappaert was
applied and refined in United States v. New Mexico." Where Cappaert
established that a reserved right should be restricted to the minimal amount
necessary to fulfill a given Congressional purpose, New Mexico focused
on the Congressional purpose.3" New Mexico established that a Congres-
sional purpose must be primary in order for a court to imply Congressional
intent to reserve water for that purpose.
In New Mexico, the United States claimed that when Congress enacted
the Organic Administration Act of 1897,"' Congress intended to reserve
water for livestock grazing, wildlife, and instream flows for the Gila
National Forest in New Mexico.' The government also relied on the
Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960 [MUSYAJ for express evidence
of Congress' concern for these uses of the national forest." In a five to
four decision, the Supreme Court held that the only waters reserved by
the government in the Gila National Forest were those necessary for the
original, primary purposes of the national forest."z Writing for the ma-
jority, Justice Rehnquist found only two primary purposes in the Organic
Act: "[tlo conserve the water flows and to furnish a continuous supply
of timber....
34. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976).
35. Id. at 141. For their authority, the Court relied not upon the dissent in California. but instead
cited to that section of the opinion which granted Indian Reservations water rights for future as well
as present needs.
36. Cappaer, also arguably expanded the doctrine of federal reserved water rights in its application
of that doctrine to groundwater. But this expansion in *finding' was at least matched by a contraction
in the 'what found'.
37. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978).
38. Id. at 699.
39. Organic Administration Act of June 4. 1897, 16 U.S.C. §§ 473-82 (1982).
40. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 698, '705 (1978).
41. Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960. Pub.L. 86-517. §§ 1-4. 16 U.S.C. §§528-31
(1982).
42. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 718 (1978).
43. Id. at 707, citing CONG. REc. 967 (1897Xstatement of Rep. McRae).
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Three principles came out of New Mexico. First, subsequent acts will
not change the reservation of water implied under earlier Congressional
acts." Second, a Congressional statute which is supplemental to an earlier
statute will not necessarily imply a new reservation of water. 5 Third, an
implied right will attach only to those Congressional purposes which are
primary. ' Of these three principles, the first and third were necessary to
reach the arguments made before the Court. The second principle was
established when the Court addressed an issue not argued by the gov-
ernment: whether a separate federal reservation arose with passage of
MUSYA. 47
The Court's second principle, that courts should not imply Congres-
sional intent for supplemental acts, followed from an analysis using the
primary-secondary purpose distinction to compare two separate acts."
The New Mexico opinion initially used the primary-secondary distinction
to rank Congressional purposes within a single act."' However, when it
examined whether Congress intended to reserve water for MUSYA, the
Court ranked MUSYA's purposes with and against those of the Organic
Act."
44. Id. at 713, and n. 21. The Supreme Court found that purposes expressed by Congress in
1960 [MUSYA] could not be read back into the original act of authorization for the Forest Service,
the Organic Act of 1897. The argument is syllogistic. Congress felt the need to expand the purposes
of the 1897 Organic Act, and therefore Congress passed MUSYA in 1960. By acting to expand
national forest purposes, therefore. Congress expressed an opinion of the narrow scope of the 1897
Organic Act. This argument would defeat any attempt to use qualifying legislation to show continuous
prior intent emanating from an earlier, primary act.
45. Id. at 714-15. The Court found that while MUSYA expanded the purposes of the 1897 Organic
Act, Congress intended these purposes to be consistent with and supplemental to the 1897 Organic
Act's original purposes. The Court concluded that since there was some actual conflict between
these purposes, Congress must have considered the purposes of 1960 to be secondary. It appears,
therefore, that acts of Congress which merely qualify earlier acts do not imply any Congressional
intention to reserve additional waters. Congress could still explicitly reserve water rights, and the
Court suggested that persuasive legislative history could lead it to find a water right even for a
qualifying act.
46. See id. at 702. The Court found that where water was valuable only for a secondary use,
Congress intended for the United States to acquire such water within a state system of appropriation.
47. Id. at 713, n. 21. In footnote 21, the Court noted that the government claimed an expanded
reserved right with a priority date of 1897, based on the Organic Act of that year. The government
had not argued for an expanded water right based on MUSYA's date of passage, 1960. The Court
noted that even if the 1960 Act expanded the reserved water rights of the United States, that expansion
would be subordinate to any appropriation under state law made prior to 1960. Therefore, it appears
that the majority may not have considered its finding that MUSYA did not expand the reserved right
to be judicial doctrine. The dissent claimed that this portion of the opinion was dicta. Id. at 718,
n. 1.
48. Id. at 714.
49. Id. at 702.09. The first use in New Mexico of the primary-secondary purpose distinction was
within the context of a single act. The Court examined the Organic Act of 1897, its legislative history
and contemporaneous political events. From that analysis, the Court determined that there were only
two primary purposes for the Act. Any other purposes claimed by the government to have been
intended in 1897 were, at best, only secondary.
50. Id. at 714-15.
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The Court first found that MUSYA was an act supplemental to the
Organic Act. The Court then reasoned that MUSYA's purposes must be
consistent with purposes of the Organic Act. The purposes of MUSYA,
however, conflicted with the purposes of the Organic Act." The Court
resolved this apparent contradiction by finding that Congress must have
intended that MUSYA purposes be achieved only where not in conflict
with the purposes of the Organic Act. Therefore, MUSYA's purposes
must be secondary.52
The New Mexico opinion suggested a new test for the reserved water
rights doctrine.53 It suggested that where two acts regulate a similar
situation, the Congressional purposes of those acts may be compared. In
the face of Congressional deference to states' rights, the Court found that
it could not presume that Congress intended to reserve water for any
secondary purposes. "Without legislative history to the contrary," the
Court could not fairly imply a Congressional intent to reserve additional
waters.54 It may follow from the Court's reasoning that, with legislative
history, a court could find that Congress reserved waters even for a
supplemental act. The New Mexico Court's rationale can be broken down
into the following parts. First, Congress has expressed, and the Court
has recognized, deference to states' interest in the prior appropriation
system.5 Second, the clear meaning of MUSYA is that it is merely
supplemental to the Organic Act of 1897.56 Third, the purposes of MU-
SYA conflict with the primary purposes of the Organic Act.57 Fourth,
viewed in light of the Organic Act's purposes, the additional purposes of
51. The Court determined that an Organic Act purpose of conserving water flows was intended
to make water available to the arid western states. Id. at 713. The Court found that this purpose
conflicted with many of MUSYA's purposes, such as instream flows and water for stockwatering.
Id. at 714-15.
52. This argument turns the primary-secondary distinction on its head. Here, the Court has not
discovered what Congressional purposes are of primary importance in MUSYA, but has decided
what purposes in MUSYA, not previously recognized in the Organic Act, could have been primary
to the Organic Act. What is called a test in this Note, and what was used as a test in the Sierra
opinion, is in fact only a restatement. The Court's determination in U.S. v. New Mexico that MUSYA
was supplemental to the Organic Act, meant that MUSYA was secondary to the Organic Act.Therefore.
it followed that MUSYA purposes must be secondary to, or consistent with, those of the Organic
Act.
53. Federal courts' acceptance of the second method of testing an act's primary purposes in part
depends upon whether they rmad the conclusion reached as dicta or doctrine. The dissent in New
Mexico, and Rehnquist's own footnote 21 indicated that the Court had not directly ruled against a
second reserved water right based on MUSYA. See supra note 44. The author of the Sierra opinion,
however, found that the Court in New Mexico had held there to be no reserved rights for the secondary
purposes of MUSYA. Sierra, 622 F.Supp. at 854. This view was also taken by the Colorado Supreme
Court in United States v. City and County of Denver, 656 P.2d I, 24-25 (Colo. 1982).
54. New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 715.
55. Id. at 702.
56. Id. at 714.
57. See id. at 715.
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MUSYA must be secondary."' Fifth, absent legislative history to the con-
trary, the Court presumes that Congress intended for these secondary
purposes to be achieved within the state's system of prior appropriation;
not on the basis of the reserved water rights doctrine. 9
ANALYSIS OF SIERRA CLUB v. BLOCK
In Sierra Club v. Block, the first major reserved water rights case since
New Mexico, a district court held that when Congress passed the Wil-
derness Act it intended to create a federal reserved water right for wil-
derness areas.' The opinion distinguished the Congressional intent behind
passage of the Wilderness Act from the New Mexico Court's determination
of intent behind MUSYA in three ways. First, unlike the New Mexico
Court's finding that MUSYA was supplemental to the Organic Act, the
Sierra court found that the Wilderness Act was a separate, intentional
withdrawal and reservation of lands." Second, unlike the New Mexico
Court's finding purposes of MUSYA inconsistent with purposes of the
Organic Act, the Sierra court found purposes of the Wilderness Act
consistent with purposes of the Organic Act.'2 Finally, in contrast to the
New Mexico Court's analysis- of MUSYA, the Sierra court found the
legislative history surrounding passage of the Wilderness Act revealed
Congressional intent to reserve waters. 3
This Note focuses on the structure of the Sierra court's reasoning. It
is this writer's contention that the Sierra court need not and should not
have compared the purposes of the Wilderness Act to those of the Organic
Act. The issue of consistent purposes arose in New Mexico because the
Court found MUSYA was supplemental to the Organic Act, and MUSYA
purposes, therefore, must only supplement purposes of the Organic Act."
The Sierra court found the opposite: the Wilderness Act was not supple-
mental to the Organic Act. Therefore, the Sierra court need not have
compared purposes of the two acts for consistency.
When the Sierra court compared the two acts' purposes, the court
subtly altered reserved rights doctrine. Instead of focusing on the Wil-
derness Act in order to determine Congressional intent, the Sierra court's
consistent purposes analysis focused on the Act's purposes. As a result,
the Sierra opinion complicated its analysis of Congressional intent with
58. Id.
59. See id. at 702, 715.
60. Sierra, 622 F.Supp. 842, 851 (D.C.Colo. 1985).
61. Id. at 858.
62. Id. at 860.
63. Id. at 858-859.
64. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 714-715 (1978). Because MUSYA was supplemental, the Court
could not recognize purposes in MUSYA which conflicted with the Organic Act. An act intended to
supplement should not supersede its predecessor.
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issues of water use. In addition, by finding the two acts' purposes con-
sistent, the Sierra court undermined its initial and central finding that the
Wilderness Act was different from, and not supplemental to, the Organic
Act. 65
The Sierra court gave three reasons to support its finding that the
Wilderness Act represented a withdrawal and reservation of lands.6' First,
the Act called for a withdrawal of lands from purposes and uses set forth
in the Organic Act.67 Second, the Wilderness Act set forth specific pur-
poses, suggesting an independent Congressional scheme.6t Finally, the
legislative history was replete with legislators' use of the word "reser-
vation. "6
Having found that Congress intended for the Wilderness Act to be a
withdrawal and reservation of lands for which water rights could be
reserved, the Sierra court asked whether Congress intended to reserve
water rights.7" The court found that wilderness could not exist without
water.7 Since without water the essential purposes of the Wilderness Act
would be frustrated, the court found that Congress must have intended
to reserve water for wilderness areas.72
65. The Sierra court reasoned that "[tlhe fact that the Wilderness Act withdrew designated
wilderness areas from disposal or use-related laws established Congressional intent to reserve and
withdraw those lands." Sierra, 622 P.Supp. at 857. See infra note 68.
66. As part of its finding, the Sierra court analyzed whether lands must be originally withdrawn
from the public lands to imply a reservation of water. The court found that a withdrawal need not
be made directly from the public lands. (Sierra. at 857), citing Arizona v. California (where the
Supreme Court granted rights for a second withdrawal and reservation for Havasu Lake National
Wildlife Refuge and Lake Mead National Recreational Area). Id. at 857. A Colorado Supreme Court
decision, not cited for this purpose by the Sierra court, also recognizes that Congress can intend to
reserve water for second withdrawals of land. United States v. City and County of Colorado, 656
P.2d 1, 30 (1982) (En Banc). A state supreme court could be expected to support its own state's
rights. Therefore, the Colorado court's affirmation of the federal government's power would seem
to firmly establish the principle of a second reservation of water rights. But see Kosloff, Water for
Wilderness: Colorado Court Expands Federal Reserve Water Rights, 16 ENvrt.. L. REP. 10,002
(1986).
67. Sierra, 622 F.Supp. at 855. In finding that the Wilderness Act represented a second withdrawal
and reservation of lands, the court distinguished the purposes of the Wilderness Act from the purposes
of the Organic Act: "In preserving the natural state of the wilderness areas. Congress prohibited or
seriously limited most uses inconsistent with the protection of the wilderness, such as mining,
timbercutting[sic], road-building, and other commercial uses." Id. at 851. Whereas MUSYA sug-
gested additional uses for forest service lands, those uses did not impinge on previous uses. Fishing
and recreation were not incompatible with selective harvesting of trees. The Wilderness Act, by
contrast, actually prohibited the cutting of trees.
68. id. at 855-56. The court found that the Act listed specific, important, and therefore primary
purposes. The court quoted provisions delineating spiritual, recreational, scientific, and educational
purposes.
69. Id. at 856-57.
70. Sierra, 622 F.Supp. at 858.
71. Id. at 862.
72. Id. The counter-argument is that Congress may have intended federal agencies to purchase
water rights on the market and thereby acquire rights through each state's prior appropriation system.
See New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 702-03 and notes 6 & 7.
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The Sierra court could have distinguished the New Mexico opinion and
ended its intent inquiry with the court's analysis of the Wilderness Act.
The court had found that the Wilderness Act represented a second with-
drawal and reservation of lands for which some waters were essential. A
withdrawal and a reservation of lands has been the traditional prerequisite
to finding an implied intent to reserve water."' If it were possible for the
government to argue for additional water rights without a Congressional
withdrawal, then federal respect for state law would be illusory.'4 There-
fore, the Sierra court might have argued that the courts should only
recognize an implied reservation of water where Congress has acted to
reserve lands.
New Mexico had found that MUSYA did not represent a withdrawal
and reservation of federal lands. Therefore, the New Mexico Court was
not bound by doctrine to find a reserved water right, and the consistent
purposes analysis in New Mexico was not critical to that Court's holding.
The New Mexico court used the analysis to examine Congressional intent
for a supplemental act, not an act for which traditionally a federal res-
ervation could be implied.The consistent purposes analysis, therefore,
would have no application to the Wilderness Act because the Sierra court
had found the Wilderness Act to be a withdrawal and eservation of lands.
The Sierra court did not make this argument. Instead, the court treated
the consistent purposes analysis from New Mexico as an additional test
of Congressional intent. 5
The Sierra court framed the test as whether purposes of the Wilderness
Act were inconsistent with purposes of the Organic Act and, therefore,
secondary." The court stated that when Congress passed the Wilderness
Act, Congress was concerned with protecting watersheds and preserving
water flows for downstream irrigation and domestic use." The court also
reasoned that wilderness protection enhances water quality and quantity.
Therefore, the court found the Wilderness Act protects downstream use,
and the Act was consistent with the Organic Act's purpose of conserving
water flows. This argument misconstrues New Mexico because the New
Mexico Court did not hold that conserving water flows meant protecting
only downstream users:
73. Cappaert. 426 U.S. at 139, See also New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 700.
74. Whereas the government has the power to withdraw water for a public purpose or exert
influence over the nation's waterways, deference to state laws of appropriation requires that a state's
desire for some degree of certainty be respected. By restricting the federal government's water rights
to the purposes of federal acts, the courts prevent the government from avoiding the political check
of legislative procedure.
75. Sierra. 622 F.Supp. at 859.
76. Id. at 859. This would have been a correct test, under New Mexico. for a supplemental act.
77. Id. at 859.
78. New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 715. Rehnquist wrote that reserving waters could mean "a substantial
loss in the amount of water available for irrigation and domestic use .... "Since it would be illogical
[Vol. 27
SIERRA CLUB v. BLOCK
In New Mexico, the Court stated that "A reservation of additional water
could mean a substantial loss in the amount of water available for irrigation
and domestic use." 79 The Sierra opinion found no evidence that reser-
vation of water for wilderness purposes would affect "the amount of
water available for irrigation and domestic use."' The Sierra opinion,
however, only considered the effect on downstream use." Clearly, pre-
serving instream flows protects downstream users from diversions up-
stream.8 2
However, the New Mexico Court's concern was not restricted to down-
stream users. The New Mexico opinion described the primary purpose of
preserving water flows as "a means of enhancing the quantity of water
that would be available to the settlers of the arid West.""3 Therefore, a
reservation of waters for wilderness which affected any Colorado users
could signal frustration of a primary purpose of the Organic Act. Focusing
solely on the impact of federal reservation on downstream users, the
Sierra opinion ignored upstream users in the state who might be impacted.
Failure to make a distinction between upstream and downstream use
caused the Sierra court to miss potential conflicts over wilderness waters.
These conflicts, which stem primarily from transbasin diversions, could
disprove the Sierra court's finding of consistent purposes.
Much of the water in wilderness areas is located high up in the moun-
tains, either on the western slope or in the Rocky Mountains themselves.
This water can be removed from wilderness areas and transported across
the Rocky Mountains to the Denver metropolitan area. If these waters
are unappropriated, they can be used in complex schemes both for trans-
port to the east slope, and for compensation to west slope communities.
for downstream users to be hurt by keeping water levels high upstream. Rehnquist must have meant
that losses would be suffered by upstream users within the national forest. Yet Rehnquist seemed to
take the position that any diversion for whatever purpose could harm a state appropriator. The limiting
standard for Rehnquist was clearly not actual harm, but rather the federal power to withdraw and
reserve water rights. The dissent argued in footnote 6 that even if upstream appropriators were hurt
by the reservation for instream flows, the 1897 Organic Act was not intended to benefit upstream
appropriators. Id. at 724, n. 6. It is the dissent's characterization of the 1897 Act upon which the
Sierra opinion relies.
79. Id. at 715. In context, the Court meant all the purposes of MUSYA. including instream flows,
stockwatering, and recreational purposes.
80. Sierra, 622 F.Supp. at 860-61.
81. ld. at 859.
82. The dissent in New Mexico identified this distinction and argued that Congress had never
intended to protect upstream use. New Mexico. 438 U.S. at 724. supra n. 6 (1978). See supra note
81.
83. New Mexico. 438 U.S. 696, 713 (1978).
84. An example of the kind of compromises worked between east and west slope communities
occurred in preparation for the proposed Two Forks diversion, a diversion which would affect the
Eagles Nest Wilderness Area. In return for its acquiescence to a new east slope reservoir. Summit
County in western Colorado will have the use of 3.100 acre feet of water per year. The water, rights
to which axe owned by Denver, is held in Dillon Reservoir, part of an earlier front range water
project. The Denver Post, Feb. 5, 1985, at 1, col. 6.
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Compensation is often achieved by building dams on the west slope with
east slope money. Although the waters stored behind these dams are
appropriated by the east slope, a percentage can be offered for use by
west slope communities. As a result; wilderness areas can be affected by
transbasin diversions in at least two ways: by actual withdrawals of water
and by dam building and changes in the nature of wilderness waters.
These apparent conflicts, however, might not be affected by the Sierra
court's holding. The court held that Congress intended to reserve water
for wilderness areas, but the court did not address questions of water
quantity or quality. Since the mere existence of a wilderness right does
not rule out quantity or quality compromises, water projects may continue
to affect wilderness waters after the Sierra opinion.
Even if the final Sierra opinion prohibited any withdrawals or changes
in wilderness waters, 5 transbasin diversions affecting wilderness waters
might still be legally possible. In at least one instance, a direct withdrawal
of waters from a wilderness area was specifically authorized in the
Congressional enactment which designated the wilderness area." In ad-
dition, Congress generally requires unanimous approval from a state's
Congressional delegation before designating a wilderness area in that
state. 7 Therefore, future exemptions could be granted in response to a
single Congressperson's request. Finally, any waters reserved for wil-
derness purposes would have recent priority dates. Many other water
rights with earlier and, therefore, more marketable, priority dates would
be available for trade and use among Colorado's communities, cities,
and towns.
Given Colorado citizens' access to both the legislative process and to
alternative sources of water rights, potential conflicts between Colorado
users and purposes of the Wilderness Act are arguably insubstantial. While
New Mexico interpreted the issue of providing water flows to mean pro-
viding water for arid western states, the opinion did not allow a state to
lock up its water resources for future use." Where the state is concerned
with future conflicts and has clear access to legislative and market rem-
edies for present conflicts, the state's right to claim conflict is not clear.
Nonetheless, the Sierra court's failure to recognize and distinguish these
85. See supra note 7.
86. The 1980 enabling act for the Holy Cross Wilderness area specifically exempted the Homestake
project. Sierra, 622 F.Supp. at 862. The Homestake Water Development project, undertaken by the
cities of Aurora and Colorado Springs prior to wilderness designation, involves plans to drain 20,000
acre-feet per-annum from the headwaters of Cross and Fall creeks near Vail, Colorado. The Denver
Post, Apr. 9, 1985, at A7, col. 1.
87. This Congressional practice was successfully tested by Colorado Representative Mike Strang
who held up a 1984 proposal for additions to Colorado wilderness areas. The Denver Post, Feb. 2,
1985, at A6, col. 1.
88. See Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941 (1982).
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potential conflicts leaves the opinion's finding of consistent purposes
vulnerable to reversal. If preserving water for wilderness areas negatively
impacts on present state use of the waters, then Wilderness Act purposes
may conflict with purposes of the Organic Act as defined by the New
Mexico Court.
The Sierra court presented two additional reasons for its finding that
no conflict exists between wilderness and national forest purposes. First,
legislative history addresses the question of conflict and shows that the
problem was resolved,"8 Second, the Act is clear in giving effect to all
of the purposes of the Act.' These reasons are both based upon the Sierra
court's analysis of legislative history. The court cited two Representatives'
statements that the Wilderness purposes would not conflict with estab-
lished uses of parks, monuments, forests, or wildlife refuges." The court,
therefore, found that Congress intended to make the two acts' purposes
consistent. To support its finding that Congress intended to give effect to
all of the purposes of the Wilderness Act,' 2 the Sierra court cited a
statement from a Committee Report to the House of Representatives that
protection of wilderness areas would ensure high quality water supplies.' 3
The Congressional statements cited shed little light on the possible con-
flicts with transbasin diversions; however, they may reveal why the court
used consistent purposes as a further test of Congressional intent."
The Sierra court stated that two factors led to its holding that federal
reserved water rights exist for wilderness areas: legislative history and
specific provisions of the Wilderness Act." However, the court also rec-
ognized and quoted legislative history showing Congressional desire that
the Wilderness Act not conflict with the status quo of federal and state
land policies. This apparent contradiction in Congressional purpose greatly
weakens a court's ability to find an implied reservation of water rights.
New Mexico found that without a clear Congressional purpose, courts
89. Sierra, 622 F.Supp. at 860 (1985).
90. Id. at 861.
91. Id. at 860.
92. Id. at 861.
93. Id. at 860.
94. It is possible that the Sierra court reached the consistency test because it relied in part on
legislative history to find that the Wilderness Act represented a withdrawal and reservation of lands.
Having cited to legislative history, the Sierra court may have felt compelled to resolve conflicts in
that history. The court noted, for example, that Congress appeared to want to set up a new system
of land use, while at the same time Congress desired that this new system not disturb the established
land uses in the national forest.
Alternatively, the Sierra court may have reached the consistency test because the court confused
the two separate uses made of the primary-secondary distinction in New Mexico. The court may
have felt compelled to reason through both tests as if they were one. In order to find that the purposes
of the Wilderness Act were primary, therefore, the Sierra court addressed the consistency test without
regard to whether the Wilderness Act was supplemental to the Organic Act.
95. Sierra, 622 F.Supp. at 849.
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must recognize Congressional deference to states' rights to regulate and
use their waters.' The Sierra court may have articulated a theory of
consistent purposes in order to bridge a perceived contradiction in
Congressional purpose. A finding of consistency would resolve the ap-
parent contradiction in the legislative history: Congress could intend to
preserve goals of the national forest and endorse wilderness rights. In
addition, a finding that wilderness purposes were consistent with the
Organic Act would further distinguish the Wilderness Act from MUSYA.
Summarizing the above arguments, the Sierra court distinguished New
Mexico in three ways. Unlike MUSYA, "the Wilderness Act is the initial
legislation creating an entirely new reservation of federal lands." "" Sec-
ond, the purposes of the Wilderness Act do not conflict with the purposes
of conserving water flows. Because wilderness use is non-consumptive,
the court found the New Mexico Court's fear of substantial loss inapposite.
Finally, legislative history and the Act itself demonstrate that Congress
considered all purposes of the Act primary.
The difficulty with the Sierra court's finding of consistency is that it
exposed the opinion to being both overruled or distinguished, and it
aroused state fears of federal intrusion. By comparing the purposes of
the Wilderness Act with those of the Organic Act, the opinion left some
Coloradans wondering if the new federal rights would have an appro-
priation date of 1897."8 Instead of clarifying the reserved water rights
doctrine, the Sierra opinion allowed a debate over primary purposes to
obscure the limits of federal power to reserve water.
When the Sierra court considered the MUSYA analogy, it examined
the possible conflicts between commercial uses of wilderness waters and
preservation of waters. Although it considered' only conflicts between
96. New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 702. The arguments for allowing states to regulate their own waters
are described in City and County of Denver, 656 P.2d at 20. They include recognition of a general
congressional policy of deference to state water law, mitigation of the disruptive effect of reserved
water rights on other water rights, and recognition of the highly interdependent nature of water use
on common stream systems.
97. Sierra, 622 F.Supp. at 860 (emphasis in original).
98. Newspapers quoted Harold Miskel, president of the Colorado Water Congress. stating that
the water congress feared the federal government's water rights could be construed to date back to
before the turn of the century. The Denver Post, Dec. I1, 1985, at B6, col. I. Confusion over
priority, dates is not aided by rhetorical fire directed at what is seen as federal interference. U.S.
Sen. Armstrong from Colorado, for example, denounced the Sierra opinion for. "imposing" on
ranchers, farmers, cities and other water users "who thought they had protected water rights." The
Denver Post, Dec. 6, 1985, at B4, col. 5. A final date of appropriation problem follows from
subversion of the state system of first use. Water projects, in their size and complexity must be
planned for years in advance. Water rights for the Two Forks diversion were secured from the Eagle-
Piney water system before wilderness designation of the Eagles Nest Wilderness area. While the
fact of the reservation would be unaffected by a subsequent federal reservation, the character and
scope of the cities' Two Forks plan has not yet been determined. Planners fear that any changes
they want to make will now have to be cleared with a federal judge. Id.
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downstream users and wilderness purposes, the court apparently at-
tempted to address the concerns of defendani-intervenors who represented
Colorado water users." Yet the court set a dangerous precedent.
Heretofore, debate in reserved water rights cases had focused on what
the government legitimately could reserve. Congressional purposes were
broadly analyzed to determine whether the government intended to reserve
water. The purposes were then closely scrutinized to determine the amount
of waters necessarily reserved. By comparing purposes of the Organic
Act with those of the Wilderness Act, the Sierra court made two doctrinal
innovations. "~ First, the specific scrutiny of Congressional purposes was
shifted into the threshold analysis of federal power and intent. Second,
the court's analysis of Congressional intent was not contained within a
single act. Both of these changes could draw courts prematurely into
legislative debate.
The underlying problem in Sierra Club v. Block may be the inappro-
priate use of the reserved water rights doctrine to resolve a broad conflict
of national policy. "" The reserved rights doctrine developed in the context
of the power conflict between states and the federal government. When
the Supreme Court analyzes a reserved rights case, it begins with an
assertion or examination of the federal government's power.' 2 Only as
a second step in the analysis does the Court examine whether Congress
intended to reserve a water right. The conflicts for which the courts
developed the reserved rights doctrine were between state and federal
purposes, not between user groups litigating on their own behalf.
Where the reserved right is demanded for environmental values, a new
situation arises. In Sierra Club v. Block, private citizens brought suit
against the government, demanding that the court-use a doctrine of federal
rights to force federal action. 3 Instead of the reserved right being used
to resolve a power dispute between the United States and a state or several
99. Defendant-intervenors represented several powerful factions in interstate struggles to control
Colorado's water. Mountain States Legal Foundation, the Colorado Cattlemen's Association. the
Colorado Farm Bureau, the National Cattlemen's Association. the City and County of Denver, the
Colorado Water Conservation Board, and the Colorado Water Congress.
100. Although these 'innovations' may have been suggested in the New Mexico opinion, the
Supreme Court there considered whether Congress intended to reserve water for a supplemental act.
not a withdrawal and reservation of lands.
101. The parties to the case reveal the unique and national character of this dispute. The case
was a battle not between states and the federal government, but between a national environmental
organization and government personnel carrying out the policy of the Executive branch.
102. See discussion supra, at note 9.
103. That the court resolved this case on motions for summary judgment is another indication of
the nature of the inquiry. Summary judgement may only be used where there are no significant issues
of factual dispute. Therefore, the court was not acting in a fact finding capacity, but only as an
interpreter of the law. In that role, the court might have felt particularly constrained in its analysis
of legislative purposes.
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states, the reserved right was used by one large group of users against
another group. These groups are not just local users in conflict over how
much each gets. These groups represent broad alignments of society, in
a struggle as much philosophical as practical. Where courts are at their
strongest deciding conflicts between individuals, they are at their weakest
deciding policy and philosophy for the nation.
CONCLUSION
The significance of Sierra Club v. Block lies in its extension of federal
reserved water rights to wilderness areas. If upheld, the federal reserved
right will place a new restriction on western states' control over their
watersheds. The degree to which this holding will affect decisions in other
western states depends primarily on how successfully the Sierra opinion
distinguished United States v. New Mexico.
By relying on a theory of consistent purposes, however, the Sierra
opinion may conflict with New Mexico; and the opinion may have created
a new test for finding a reserved water right in Wilderness Areas. That
right may be restricted to the amount necessary to fulfill only those
purposes which are themselves not in conflict with the original purposes
of other federal lands legislation. This test would deprive Congress of
the power to radically redesignate lands within the federal lands system.
In its effort to reach a compromise between apparently inconsistent
Congressional purposes, the Sierra court qualified its own conclusion that
Congress, when it passed the Wilderness Act, intended a second with-
drawal and reservation of lands. The opinion would have been stronger
had the court not used the consistent purposes test from New Mexico.
Congressional intent could have been gleaned from the Wilderness Act
itself, not the Act's relationship with other federal legislation. The Sierra
court could have identified the inconsistencies in the legislative history
and still have upheld the overall intent of the Wilderness Act. Issues of
water use conflicts could have been addressed in a subsequent analysis
of the amount and quality of water which Congress intended to reserve.
By mixing issues of competing interests with an analysis of Congressional
intent, the Sierra opinion may have diluted the federal reserved water
rights doctrine as an instrument of federal rights.
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